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his month’s edition of the ROA Newsletter 
presents the overall conclusions from the 
environmental service incentive (ESIs) component 
of the Roles of Agriculture Project Phase II. The 
objective of the component is to draw policy 
implications and to deliver practical policy 
guidance to design, implement and enforce ESIs 
to be consistent with poverty alleviation in 
developing countries. The main sources of 
information for this purpose are: (i) policy case 
studies undertaken under the auspices of the ROA 
Phase II (see Table 1 for their overview), (ii) other 
theoretical and empirical background papers 
prepared for the project, and (iii) other existing 
literature, particularly on the payments for forest 
environmental services in developing countries.  
 
Table 1 Overview of policy case studies 
country study location farming type environmental service 
examined 
transfer 
mechanism financing source 
Bhutan Selected sites crop and livestock farming 
wildlife habitat direct payment 
(hypothetical) 
to be determined 
Kenya Amboseli National Park 
pastoral farming wildlife habitat  direct payment 
(hypothetical) 
bed fee in lodges 
Mexico Nationwide forest water supply direct payment (actual) 
water user fees 
Morocco Western High Atlas Region 
mountain farming scenic landscape agro-tourism 
(actual) 
tourists 
Panama 
Panama Canal 
Watershed 
crop and livestock 
farming 
water supply and soil 
erosion prevention  
direct payment 
(hypothetical) 
toll from the 
Panama Canal and 
water user fees 
Philippines Nationwide rice farming genetic diversity direct payment (hypothetical) 
taxpayers 
Uganda Pallisa District wetlands water supply direct payment (hypothetical) 
beneficiaries 
 
ESIs and poverty alleviation 
It is leaned that ‘pro-poor ESIs’ needs to be 
defined clearly in order to disentangle the 
confusion over this concept. The main source of 
confusion is whether poverty alleviation is treated 
as an ex-ante objective or an ex-post consequence 
of ESIs. It is made explicit that the focus of the 
project is the latter since their primary objective is 
environmental concern by definition, and ESIs 
cannot necessarily address poverty given the 
heterogeneity and site-specificity of the incidence 
of both environmental services and poverty. As 
such, the intent is to provide appropriate guidance 
when policy makers in developing countries 
recognize the need of ESIs to be initiated in 
conformity with poverty alleviation. Such a 
pragmatic judgment leads to the following twin-
track approaches in linking poverty alleviation 
consideration with ESIs. One is a ‘proactive’ 
approach that takes poverty alleviation into 
consideration in an explicit manner by its design 
in addition to the environmental goal, while 
another is a ‘reactive’ approach whose priority 
lies to design, implement and enforce ESIs so as 
not to deteriorate existing inequality in 
distribution. 
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Policy guidance for pro-poor ESIs 
The policy guidance is structured based on the 
programme cycle of ESIs. The following provides 
concise summary of the major elements covered 
by the policy guidance. 
Design of ESIs 
• Defining targeting criteria for eligible areas: the 
criteria include the provision of environmental 
services often approximated by a particular type 
of land use or agricultural practices, the 
possibility of their loss without an intervention, 
and the existence of their beneficiaries. 
• Determining contract types and payment levels: 
the heterogeneity of producers’ opportunity 
costs and the attributes of the conservation 
outputs determine the types of contracts (e.g. 
standardized, auction, specific), while the 
amount of premium must lie between the 
minimum WTA of landowners to change their 
land use or agricultural practices and the 
maximum WTP of the beneficiaries. 
• Establishing compliance requirements: a modest 
approach is to make a payment in exchange for 
the continuation of existing land use or 
management practices, whereas a more active 
approach obliges landowners to take tangible 
actions that incur additional costs. The choice is 
partly dependent on the distribution of property 
right on the use of particular land. 
• Finding sustainable financing sources: the 
beneficiaries of an environmental service should 
bear its costs of provision (Beneficiary pays 
Principle), implying that beneficiary can vary 
depending on the spread of an environmental 
service and so does cost bearer for financing it. 
• Reducing transaction costs for collecting 
information on scheme design: The key 
challenge is to obtain information on the 
‘existence’ as well as the ‘risk of deterioration’ 
of an environmental service in a low-cost way. 
Indices based on land uses can serve for the 
former, while particular land uses or 
topographic conditions can for the latter.  
Implementation of ESIs 
• Addressing insecure or unclear land tenure: 
Contractual payments with individual farmers 
cannot be applied to the land with insecure 
tenure, common land or common property 
resources. Forming and implementing a contract 
collectively by members who manage an 
environmental service irrespective of the 
ownership of the land can be a solution. 
• Overcoming initial investment requirements: 
This is an issue when ESIs oblige participants to 
take additional actions that incur opportunity 
costs and thus necessitate considerable 
investment. A possible approach is front-
loading payments with a large part of the 
payment in the early years and much smaller 
payments in later years. 
• Easing technical capacity constraints: In light of 
the limited cases of ESIs in developing 
countries in general and those for agricultural 
sector in particular, broad-based capacity 
building should be an integral part of ESI 
initiatives not only for participants but also their 
initiators (e.g. policy makers and local NGOs). 
• Reducing transaction costs for arranging and 
implementing a contract: transaction costs 
create inherent incentive to favor large-scale 
farmers who are often wealthier than small-
scale counterparts. Possible solutions include 
standardizing a contract, simplifying the 
procedure and compensating the transaction 
costs incurred in the implementation of ESIs. 
Enforcement of ESIs 
• Establishing an effective punishment scheme: 
landowners participating to ESIs have an 
inherence incentive to free-ride to the 
programme without a credible punishment 
scheme. 
• Reducing transaction costs for monitoring a 
contract: an information asymmetry between 
recipients and initiators of ESIs creates high 
transaction costs for monitoring. Innovative 
devices for reducing monitoring costs include 
the use of satellite images to monitor the 
obedience to compliance conditions and a 
collective punishment in which all participants 
are obliged to repay all payments they received 
even if only one member violates a contract. 
•  
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